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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
Thomas Edward Boyce timely appeals from an Order of Revocation of Probation
and

Reducing Sentence and Commitment, wherein the district court revoked

Mr. Boyce's probation and imposed a unified sentence of eight years, with three years
fixed, which was reduced from a unified sentence of ten years, with three years fixed,
for which Mr. Boyce received for his guilty plea to grand theft. Mr. Boyce argues that
the Idaho Supreme Court denied him due process of law when it refused to augment
the record with transcripts of various hearings. Additionally, Mr. Boyce argues that the
district court abused its discretion when it revoked his probation.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
Mr. Boyce was being threatened with severe bodily injury because he owed
approximately $2,500

in

gambling

debts.

(Presentence

Investigation

Report

(hereinafter, PSI), pp.2, 5-6.) 1 Mr. Boyce felt that his life could have been in danger if he

failed to pay these debts. (PSI, p.22.) In order to pay these debts, Mr. Boyce stole
approximately $2,500 from his former employer. (PSI, p.9.)
Mr. Boyce was charged with grand theft and entered a guilty plea to that charge.
(R., p.36.) Thereafter, the district court imposed a unified sentence of ten years, with

three years fixed, but retained jurisdiction.

(R., pp.36-38.)

Mr. Boyce successfully

completed a period of retained jurisdiction and, in June of 2003, the district
court suspended Mr. Boyce's sentence and placed him on probation. (R., pp.45-48.)

1

The PSI was submitted in an electronic PDF format. For ease of citation, this brief will
adhere to the PDF pagination.
1

In July of 2010, approximately seven years later, the State filed a motion for a
probation violation, wherein the State alleged Mr. Boyce had changed his residence
without his probation officer's permission, absconded from supervision, and had
wrongfully taken $1,000 from his former employer. (R., pp. 51-53.) However, the State
dismissed the allegation that Mr. Boyce had wrongfully taken funds from his former
employer because it lacked evidence to pursue the allegation. (11/10/10 Tr., p.5, Ls.1215; 12/08/10 Tr., p.9, L.25 - p.10, L.6.) The district court found Mr. Boyce had violated
the terms of his probation for changing his residence without his probation officer's
permission and absconded from supervision.

2

(11/10/10 Tr., p.26, L.2 - p.27, L.2.)

Thereafter, the district court ordered into execution the original sentence, but reduced it
from ten years, with three years fixed, to a unified sentence of eight years, with three
years fixed, pursuant to I.C.R. 35.

(R., pp.81-82.)

Mr. Boyce timely appeals.

(R., pp.84-87.)
On appeal, Mr. Boyce's appellate counsel filed a motion to augment and suspend
the briefing schedule, wherein appellate counsel requested that the record on appeal be
augmented with various transcripts. (Motion to Augment and to Suspend the Briefing
Schedule and Statement in Support Thereof, (hereinafter, Motion to Augment), pp.1-6.)
The State objected to Mr. Boyce's request for the transcripts. (Objection to "Motion to
Augment and to Suspend the Briefing Schedule and Statement in Support Thereof,"

(hereinafter, Objection to Motion to Augment), pp.1-4.) Thereafter, the Idaho Supreme
Court entered its Order Denying Motion to Augment and to Suspend the Briefing
Schedule, denying Mr. Boyce's request for the transcripts.

2

(Order Denying Motion to

The specffic terms of probation for which the district court found Mr. Boyce had
violated are not currently in the record on appeal. Accordingly, a motion to augment
has been filed concurrently herewith.
2

Augment and Suspend the Briefing Schedule (hereinafter, Order Denying Motion to
Augment), p.1)

3

ISSUES
1. Did the Idaho Supreme Court deny Mr. Boyce due process and equal protection
when it denied his Motion to Augment with the requested transcripts?
2. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it revoked Mr. Boyce's probation?

4

ARGUMENT
I.
The Idaho Supreme Court Denied Mr. Boyce Due Process And Equal Protection When
It Denied His Motion To Augment The Record With The Requested Transcripts

A.

Introduction
A long line of United States Supreme Court cases hold that it is a violation of the

Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause and equal protection clause to deny an
indigent defendant access to transcripts of trial proceedings which are relevant to issues
the defendant intends to raise on appeal.

The only way a court can constitutionally

preclude an indigent defendant access to a requested transcript is if the State can prove
that the transcript is irrelevant to the appeal.
In this case, Mr. Boyce filed Motion to Augment, requesting transcripts of various
hearings, wherein he argued that, when determining whether to revoke probation, a
district court can considered all of the hearings before and after sentencing. On appeal,
Mr. Boyce is challenging the Idaho Supreme Court's denial of his request for transcripts
of the change of plea hearing held on November 19, 2002, the sentencing hearing held
on December 12, 2002, the jurisdictional review hearing held on June 10, 2003,
Admit/Deny hearing held on April 19, 2010, and the disposition hearing held on
August 2, 2010.

Mr. Boyce asserts that the requested transcripts are relevant to the

issues addressed at the probation revocation hearing because they occurred before and
after sentencing, and the district court can, therefore, rely on its memory of those
hearings when it decided to revoke Mr. Boyce's probation.
Supreme Court erred in denying his request.

5

Therefore, the Idaho

B.

The Idaho Supreme Court Denied Mr. Boyce Due Process And Equal
Protection When It Denied His Motion To Augment The Record With The
Requested Transcripts

1.

The Idaho Supreme Court. By Failing To Provide Mr. Boyce With
Access To The Requested Transcripts, Has Denied Him Due Process
Because He Cannot Obtain A Merit Based Appellate Review Of His
Sentencing Claims

The constitutions of both United States and the State of Idaho guarantee a
criminal defendant due process of law. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV; ID. CONST. art.
I, §13.
It is firmly established that due process requires notice and a meaningful
opportunity to be heard. Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545 (1965); Cole
v. Arkansas, 333 U.S. 196 (1948). The Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment also protects against arbitrary and capricious acts
of the government. Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980). Due
process requires that judicial proceedings be "fundamentally fair."
Lassiter v. Department of Soc. Serv. of Durham Cty., 452 U.S. 18, 24
(1981).
State v. Card, 121 Idaho 425, 445 (1991) (overruled on other grounds by State v. Wood,

132 Idaho 88 (1998)). Additionally, the Idaho Supreme Court has "applied the United
States Supreme Court's standard for interpreting the due process clause of the United
States Constitution to art. I, Section 13 of the Idaho Constitution." Maresh v. State,
Dept. of Health and Welfare ex rel. Caballero, 132 Idaho 221, 227 (1998) (citing
Smith v. Idaho Dep't of Correction, 128 Idaho 768, 771 (1996)).

In Idaho, a criminal defendant's right to appeal is created by statute. See
I.C. § 19-2801. Idaho statutes dictate that if an indigent defendant requests a transcript,
the cost of such transcript must be created at county expense.

I. C. § 1-1105(2);

I.C. § 19-863(a). Idaho court rules also address this issue. Idaho Criminal Rule 5.2
mandates the production of transcripts when requested by an indigent defendant.
I.C.R. 5.2(a).

Further, "[t]ranscripts may be requested of any hearing or proceeding
6

before the court .... " Id. Idaho Criminal Rule 54.7 further enables a district court to
"order a transcript to be prepared at county expense if the appellant is exempt from
paying such a fee as provided by statute or law." I.C.R. 54.7(a).
An appeal from an order revoking probation is an appeal of right as defined in
Idaho Appellate Rule 11. An order revoking probation is an order "made after judgment
affecting the substantial rights of the defendant." State v. Dryden, 105 Idaho 848, 852
(Ct. App. 1983) (citing to I.AR. 11).
The United States Supreme Court has issued a long line of cases that directly
address whether indigent defendants, who have a statutory right to an appeal, can
require the state to pay for an appellate record including verbatim transcripts of the
relevant trial proceedings. There are two fundamental themes which permeate these
cases. The first theme is that the Fourteenth Amendment's due process and equal
protection clauses are interpreted broadly. Any disparate treatment between indigent
defendants and those with financial means is not tolerated.

However, the second

theme limits the states' obligation to provide indigent defendants with a record for
review.
request.

The states do not have to provide indigent defendants with everything they
In order to meet the constitutional mandates of due process and equal

protection, the states must provide indigent defendants with an appellate record unless
some or all of the requested materials are unnecessary or frivolous.
The seminal opinion in this line of cases is Griffin v. Illinois 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
In that case, two indigent defendant's "filed a motion in the trial court asking that a
certified copy of the entire record, including a stenographic transcript of the
proceedings, be furnished them without cost." Griffin, 351 at 13. At that time, the State
of Illinois provided free transcripts for indigent defendants that had been sentenced to
7

death, but required defendants in all other criminal cases to purchase transcripts
themselves. Id. at 14. The sole question before the United States Supreme Court was
whether the denial of the requested transcripts to indigent non-death penalty defendants
was a denial of due process or equal protection. Id. at 16.
The Supreme Court initially noted that "[p]roviding equal justice for poor and rich,
weak and powerful alike is an age old problem." Id. "Both equal protection and due
process emphasize the central aim of our entire judicial system-all people charged with
crime must, so far as the law is concerned, 'stand on an equality before the bar of
justice in every American court."' Id. at 17 (quoting Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227,
241 (1940)). "In criminal trials a State can no more discriminate on account of poverty
than on account of religion, race, or color." Id.

The Supreme Court went on to hold as

follows:
There is no meaningful distinction between a rule which would deny the
poor the right to defend themselves in a trial court and one which
effectively denies the poor an adequate appellate review accorded to all
who have money enough to pay the costs in advance. It is true that a
State is not required by the Federal Constitution to provide appellate
courts or a right to appellate review at all. But that is not to say that a
State that does grant appellate review can do so in a way that
discriminates against some convicted defendants on account of their
poverty. Appellate review has now become an integral part of the Illinois
trial system for finally adjudicating the guilt or innocence of a defendant.
Consequently at all stages of the proceedings the Due Process and Equal
Protection Clauses protect persons like petitioners from invidious
discriminations.

Id. at 18 (citations and footnotes omitted).

In order to satisfy the constitutional

mandates of both due process and equal protection, an indigent defendant must be
provided with a record which facilitates an effective merits-related appellate review. At
the same time, the Supreme Court noted that a stenographic transcript is not necessary
in instances where a less expensive, yet adequate, alternative exists. Id. at 20.
8

In Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252 (1959), the Supreme Court reaffirmed its holding
in Griffin when it struck down a requirement that all appeals to the Ohio Supreme Court
be accompanied with a requisite filing fee, regardless of a defendant's indigency.

In

that case, the State argued that the defendant had already received appellate review of
his conviction by the Ohio appellate court. Burns, 360 U.S. at 257.

The United States

Supreme Court rejected this argument and ruled that "once the State chooses to
establish appellate review in criminal cases, it may not foreclose indigents from access
to any phase of that procedure because of their poverty." Id. "This principle is no less
applicable where the State has afforded an indigent defendant access to the first phase
of its appellate procedure but has effectively foreclosed access to the second phase of
that procedure solely because of his indigency." Id.
In State v. Draper, 372 U.S. 487 (1963), the Supreme Court addressed a
procedure determining access to transcripts based on a frivolousness standard. "Under
the present standard, ... , they must convince the trial judge that their contentions of
error have merit before they can obtain the free transcript necessary to prosecute their
appeal." Draper, 372 U.S. 494. The Supreme Court first expanded upon its statement
in Griffin, that a stenographic transcript is not required if an equivalent alternative is
available, by adding a relevancy requirement when stating that "part or all of the
stenographic transcript in certain cases will not be germane to consideration of the
appeal, and a State will not be required to expend its funds unnecessarily in such
circumstances." Id. at 495. The Court went on to discuss the specific issues raised for
appeal by the defendants to decide the relevance of the requested transcripts.

The

Court ultimately concluded that the issues raised by the defendant's could not be

9

adequately reviewed without resorting to the stenographic transcripts of the trial
proceedings. Id. at 497-99.
Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189 (1971), extended the Griffin protections

to defendants convicted of non-felony offenses, and placed the burden on the State to
prove that the requests for verbatim transcripts are not relevant to the issues raised on
appeal. In doing so, it was held that a defendant need only make a colorable argument
that he/she needs items to create a complete record on appeal. Id. at 195. If the State
wants to deny the defendant's request, it is the State's burden to prove that the
requested items are not necessary for the appeal. Id.
This authority has been recognized by both the Idaho Supreme Court and the
Idaho Court of Appeals.

See Gardener v. State, 91 Idaho 909 (1967); State v.

Callaghan, 143 Idaho 856 (Ct. App. 2006); State v. Braaten, 144 Idaho 60 (Ct App.

2007).
An application of the foregoing rules to the facts of this case creates a situation
analogous Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477 (1863).

In that case, a transcript was

necessary to perfect an appeal and the appeal could be dismissed without the
transcript. Lane, 327 U.S. at 478-81. Similarly in Idaho, an appellant must provide an
adequate record or the appeal can be dismissed.

"It is well established that an

appellant bears the burden to provide an adequate record upon which the appellate
court can review the merits of the claims of error, ... and where pertinent portions of the
record are missing on appeal, they are presumed to support the actions of the trial
court." State v. Coma, 133 Idaho 29, 34 (Ct. App. 1999) (citing State v. Beck, 128 Idaho
416,422 (Ct. App. 1996); State v. Beason, 119 Idaho 103, 105 (Ct. App. 1991); State v.
Murinko, 108 Idaho 872, 873 (Ct. App. 1985); State v. Repici, 122 Idaho 538, 541
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(Ct. App. 1992)). If the transcripts are missing, but the record contains court minutes,
that may be sufficient so that a "meaningful review of [an appellant's] claim is possible,
although the Idaho Court of Appeals has "strongly suggest[ed] that appellate counsel
not rely on the district court minutes to provide an adequate record for [that] Court's
review."

State v. Murphy, 133 Idaho 489, 491 (Ct. App. 1999).

If Mr. Boyce fails to

provide the appellate court with the requested items, the legal presumption will apply
and Mr. Boyce's claims will not be addressed on their actual merits. If it is state action
alone, which prevents him from access to the requested items, then such action is a
violation of due process, as per Lane, and any such presumption should no longer
apply.
Additionally, the requested items are within an Idaho appellate court's scope of
review. Transcripts of the various probation violation admission and dispositional
hearings are relevant because Idaho appellate courts review ALL proceedings following
sentencing when determining whether the court appropriately revoked probation. See

State v. Hanington, 148 Idaho 26, 28 (Ct. App. 2009) ("When we review a sentence that
is ordered into execution following a period of probation, we will examine the entire

record encompassing events before and after the original judgment.

We base our

review upon the facts existing when the sentence was imposed as well as events
occurring between the original sentencing and the revocation of probation." (emphasis
added)).
In sum, there is a long line of cases which repeatedly hold it is a violation of both
due process and equal protection under to deny indigent defendants transcripts of trial
proceedings on appeal.

The decision to deny Mr. Boyce's Motion to Augment will

render his appeal meaningless because it will be presumed that the missing transcripts
11

support the district court's order revoking his probation. This functions as a procedural
bar to the review of Mr. Boyce's appellate sentencing claims on the merits, and
therefore, Mr. Boyce should either be provided with the requested transcripts or the
presumption should not be applied.

2.

The Idaho Supreme Court, By Failing To Provide Mr. Boyce With
Access To The Requested Transcript Has Denied Him Due Process
Because He Cannot Obtain Effective Assistance Of Counsel On Appeal

In Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932) the Sixth Amendment right to counsel
in the context of death penalty cases was selectively incorporated to the states through
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution. In coming to this conclusion, the United State Supreme Court reasoned
that the ability to be heard by counsel is so inextricable related to due process that the
denial of counsel is tantamount to the denial of a hearing. Powell, 287 U.S. at 69. The
Supreme Court also stated that under the facts of Powell "the necessity of counsel was
so vital and imperative that the failure to make an effective appointment of counsel was
likewise a denial of due process within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment ...
(to] hold otherwise would to ignore the fundamental postulate, already adverted to, 'that
there are certain immutable principles of justice which inhere in the very idea of free
government which no member of the Union may disregard."' Id. at 71-72.
In Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, (1963), the United States Supreme Court
relied on Griffin, supra, and is progeny and determined that the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment requires the states to provide indigent defendants the
right to counsel on appeal. In Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387 (1985), the protection of
Douglas was extended to the right to effective assistance of counsel on appeal.

According to the United State Supreme Court:
12

In short, the promise of Douglas that a criminal defendant has a right to counsel
on appeal-like the promise of Gideon that a criminal defendant has a right to
counsel at trial would be a futile gesture unless it comprehended the right to
effective assistance of counsel.
Evitts, 469 U.S. at 397.
The remaining issue is defining effective assistance of counsel. According to the
United States Supreme Court,

appellate counsel must make a conscientious

examination of the case and file a brief in support of the best arguments to be made.
Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967) held that the constitutional requirements
of substantial equality and fair process "can only be attained where counsel acts as an
active advocate on behalf of his client .... [Counsel's] role as advocate requires that he
support his client's interest's to the best of his ability." See also Banuelos v. State, 127
Idaho 860, 865 (Ct. App. 1995).

In this case, the lack of access to the requested

transcripts has prevented appellate counsel from making a conscientious examination
of the case and has potentially prevented appellate counsel from determining whether
there is an additional issue to raise, or whether there is a factual support either in favor
of any argument made or either undercutting an argument. Therefore, Mr. Boyce has
not obtained review of the court proceedings based on the merits and was not provided
with effective assistance of counsel in that endeavor.
Furthermore, in State v. Charboneau, 116 Idaho 129, 137 (1989) (overruled on
other grounds by State v. Card, 121 Idaho 425 (1991)), the starting point of evaluating
whether counsel renders effective assistance of counsel in a criminal action is the
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, STANDARDS FOR CRIMNAL JUSTICE, THE DEFENSE FUNCTION.

These standards still offer insight into the role and responsibilities of appellate counsel.
Regarding appellate counsel, the standards state:

13

Appellate counsel should give a client his or her best professional
evaluation of the questions that might be presented on appeal. Counsel,
when inquiring into the case, should consider all issues that might affect
the validity of the judgment of conviction and sentence .... Counsel should
advise on the probable outcome of a challenge to the conviction or
sentence. Counsel should endeavor to persuade the client to abandon a
wholly frivolous appeal or to eliminate contentions lacking in substance.
Standard 4-8.3(b).

In the absence of access to the requested transcripts, appellate

counsel neither can make a professional evaluation of the questions that might be
presented on appeal, nor can appellate counsel consider all issues that might affect the
district court's decision to revoke Mr. Boyce's probation.

Counsel is also unable to

advise Mr. Boyce on the probable role the transcripts may play in the appeal.
Mr. Boyce is entitled to effective assistance of counsel in this appeal, and
effective assistance cannot be given in the absence of access to all of the relevant
transcripts.

Therefore, the Idaho Supreme Court has denied Mr. Boyce his

constitutional right to due process which includes a right to the effective assistance of
counsel in this appeal. Accordingly, appellate counsel should be provided with access
to the requested transcripts and should be allowed the opportunity to provide any
necessary supplemental briefing raising issues which arise as a result of that review.

11.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Revoked Mr. Boyce's Probation

A.

Introduction
Mr. Boyce had successfully completed seven years of probation, without any

alleged probation violations.

Towards the end of the seventh year of probation,

Mr. Boyce discovered that his wife was having an affair. His wife then left him and took
their three children. Mr. Boyce went camping to clear his mind and in the process he
14

violated two terms of his probation. However, those terms of probation were not willful
violated and the actual violations were very technical.

In light of the foregoing, the

district court abused its discretion when it revoked Mr. Boyce's probation.

B.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Revoked Mr. Boyce's Probation
Mr. Boyce asserts that, given any view of the facts, the district court abused its

discretion when it revoked his probation.

When a defendant appeals from an order

revoking probation this Court has utilized the following framework:
The decision to revoke a defendant's probation on a suspended sentence
is within the discretion of the district court. I.C. § 20-222. In a probation
revocation proceeding, two threshold questions are posed: (1) did the
probationer violate the terms of probation; and, if so, (2) should probation
be revoked? State v. Case, 112 Idaho 1136 (Ct.App.1987).
State v. Corder, 115 Idaho 1137, 1138 (Ct. App. 1989).

Mr. Boyce concedes that he violated the terms his probation. Accordingly, he
only contests the district court's decision to revoke his probation.

"A district court's

decision to revoke probation will not be overturned on appeal absent a showing that the
court abused its discretion." State v. Sanchez, 149 Idaho 102, 105 (2009) (citing to
State v. Lafferty, 125 Idaho 378, 381 (Ct. App. 1994)). "When a district court's

discretionary decision is reviewed on appeal, the appellate court conducts a multi-tiered
inquiry to determine whether the lower court correctly perceived the issue as one of
discretion, acted within the boundaries of such discretion and consistently with any legal
standards applicable to the specific choices before it, and reached its decision by an
exercise of reason." State v. Knutsen, 138 Idaho 918, 923 (Ct. App. 2003) (citing to
State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 600 (1989)).

"In deciding whether revocation of probation is the appropriate response to a
violation, the court considers whether the probation is achieving the goal of
15

rehabilitation and whether continued probation is consistent with the protection of
society." State v. Leach, 135 Idaho 525, 529 (Ct. App. 2001) (citing to State v. Jones,
123 Idaho 315, 318 (Ct. App. 1993); State v. Hass, 114 Idaho 554, 558 (Ct. App.
1988)). "[l]f a probationer's violation of a probation condition was not willful, or was
beyond the probationer's control, a court may not revoke probation and order
imprisonment without first considering alternative methods to address the violation." Id.

(citing to Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 672-73 (1983); Lafferty, 125 Idaho at 38283)). "Only if the trial court determines that alternatives to imprisonment are not
adequate in a particular situation to meet the state's legitimate interest in punishment,
deterrence, or the protection of society, may the court imprison a probationer who has
made sufficient, genuine efforts to obey the terms of the probation order." Id.
As a preliminary point, Mr. Boyce successfully completed seven years of
probation without any probation violation allegations. (11/10/10 Tr., p.18, Ls.12-18.)
Even though the district court found that Mr. Boyce violated his probation when
he absconded, this violation is relatively benign when it is viewed in a larger context.
Mr. Boyce's wife was having an affair with a police officer. (11/10/10 Tr., p.21, Ls.4-6.)
His wife then left him and would not let him see his children. (12/08/10 Tr., p.8, Ls.3-7.)
Mr. Boyce was understandable distraught over the situation, and decided to go camping
to clear his head. (12/08/10 Tr., p.8, Ls.6-8.) Mr. Boyce informed his probation officer
about his plans to go camping and his probation officer said that would be fine.
(11/10/10 Tr., p.19, L.18 - p.20, L.3.)

Mr. Boyce went camping for three weeks, but

regularly returned and checked his messages and mail. (11/10/10 Tr., p.16, Ls.6-18.)
During this period of time, Mr. Boyce never received any messages from his probation
officer. (11/10/10 Tr., p.6, Ls.6-18.) Additionally, Mr. Boyce never missed any of his
16

scheduled probation appointments. (11/10/10 Tr., p.16, Ls.19-24.) Upon returning, he
checked in with his probation officer at his next scheduled appointment.
Tr., p.16, Ls.6-24.)

(11/10/1 0

Even the district court noted that this was merely a technical

violation. (11/10/10 Tr., p.26, Ls.17-18.)

IVlr. Boyce thought that he was in compliance

with the terms of his probation while he was camping. (11/10/10 Tr., p.18, Ls.9-12.)
Mr. Boyce did not willfully change his address without written permission from his
probation officer. While Mr. Boyce was camping, his landlord contacted his mother and
to inform her that Mr. Boyce was behind on his rent. (PSI, p.130.) Without contacting
Mr. Boyce, his mother and her mutual friend moved his personal property into a different
residence. (11/10/10 Tr., p.17, Ls.10-15.) Mr. Boyce reported his change of residence
to his probation officer the day after he returned from camping. (11/10/10 Tr., p.18, L.24
- p.19, L.14.)

After telling his probation officer about the change of residence, the

probation officer said "okay." (11/10/10 Tr., p.17, Ls.16-20.) Even though Mr. Boyce
was supposed to inform his probation officer in writing before he changed residence.
Mr. Boyce and his probation officer had developed a customary practice where
Mr. Boyce would orally inform his probation officer after he had moved.

(11/10/1 O

Tr., p.17, L.21 - p.18, L.1.)
In sum, Mr. Boyce had successfully completed seven years of probation and his
two probation violations were very innocuous.

In light of the foregoing, Mr. Boyce's

probation was facilitating his rehabilitation and his probation violations, when viewed in
a vacuum, did not indicate that he poses a threat to society. Therefore, the district court
abused its discretion when it revoked Mr. Boyce's probation.
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CONCLUSION
Appellate counsel respectfully requests access to the requested transcript and
the opportunity to provide any necessary supplemental briefing raising issues which
arise as a result of that review.

In the event this request is denied, Mr. Boyce

respectfully requests that this Court remand this matter with instruction for the district
court to place Mr. Boyce on probation with terms of probation it deems appropriate.
DATED this 13th day of January, 2012.

/2--~,·=-SHAWN F. WILKERSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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